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In the Supreme Court
Of the state of Utah
ST.ATE OF l7T.-\H.

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

ESTHER BES.ARES.

Defendant and .A.ppt?llant.
ST.ATEMENT

The defendant, charged 'vith first degree murder, was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter on June 7, 1929, by a
jury in the District Court of Weber County, Utah, Judge
George S. Barker presiding. and appeals.
The victim, one Jack Farish, was stabbed with a butcher
knife at a bootleg joint in Ogden, after midnight, April 8,
i929, and died on the way to the hospital.
Thelma Bruerton, a daughter of the defendant, was in
charge of the place. Algernon Bruerton, Thelma's husband~
was then in the county jail under sentence for violating the
liquor law. The house is an old residence situated on Twenty-fourth Street near the Post Office and has been remodeled for the illicit use. Entrance is into a living room in
the middle of the structure. On the east is a sewing room;
on the west are two bedrooms; north of the living room is
the dance hall; east of the dance hall, reached by a narrow
hallway, is the kitchen.
The situation at the joint was evidently getting out of
hand on account of Thelma's looseness, and the mother-
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a large, plain, hard-working, matronly woman-exasperated
and outraged at the carryings on, went there in the evening of the night of the tragedy to try to hold things down
and see that no greater harm should come to her errant
daughter. Thelma, the blubbery type, a starry-eyed blond
gone fat, is nevertheless a mother's only child.
Farish and the daughter baa been on a debauch for a
couple of days and nights and were still going strong.
Moonshine whisky, with home-brew for chasers, was freely
imbibed by all except the mother. This concoction, in mixed
company, behind closed shutters, is the devil's caldron.
Farish was pretty full and Thelma was sloppy drunk. Farish furnished the hard liquor and the house supplied the
beer.
Nine persons were on the premises when the stabbing
occurred, but only three were· produced as witnesses at the
trial. Mr. and Mrs. Marsh, who lived in a room in the
house, and a Mr. Wolsky had left the State for parts unknown. Thelma, although present in court throughout the
trial, under subpoena by the State, was not sworn by either
side. An adopted son of the defendant was sleeping in the
bedroom.
Max Pace, weasel faced, cook and barber, who did not
work much at either, and Bob Field, card sharp and a battlescarred veteran of the Ogden Police Court, pals of Farish
(habitues of the underworld all three), were witnesses for
the State, and the defendant testified in her own behalf.
Sundry doctors, undertakers, plain clothes men, deputy
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sheriffs and character 'vitnesses added bih;; of formal fact
here and there, but are not included in the record on appeal
since nothing of signifil!ance to our point appeared from
their contributions.
The theory of the prosecution \vas that since the defendant "~a~ there and held the knife that did the deed
she ought to be found guilty of something. The jury, seemingly, took that 'iew also and returned a verdict for the
lowest grade of homicide permitted under the court's instructions.
The record reveals a nasty mess. The only orchid on
the dung hill i~ the mother instinct \Yhich flared into livid
flame in defense of a daughter's tattered soul.
The testimony which we bring up on the appeal covers
less than a hundred pages of transcript (Tr. 2-95) and is
condensed to ten pages of abstract ( Abs. 11-20) .
Pace, for the State, testified that Farish and he started
to lea\e the house and that Thelma said she was going too;
that as these three were at the street door going out together, the mother forbade Thelma to go; she called Farish
vile names and the daughter struck the mother and the
two women engaged in a scuffle; that they fought across
the room into the dance hall; that Farish followed the melee
to the other doorway; that Field and Pace grabbed Wolsky,
who started toward Farish, and "oozed" him into the
kitchen; that the defendant broke away from her daughter
and ran into the kitchen and returned with a long butcher
knife and stuck it through Farish under the left ribs as
he was standing in the doorway between the front room
and the dance hall. Fields said he came in after the argu ..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
ment started and witnessed the affair, taking part only to
the extent of aiding in the "oozing" of Wolsky.
The defendant gave a different version.
or the relating of it is nauseating.

The reading

She testified that the

party had quieted down about midnight and Farish and
Thelma were in the kitchen alone.
ing solitaire in the front room.

The mother ·was play-

The coUple had been ex-

hibiting amorous tendencies as the evening wore on and
the mother became alarmed at the length of the period of
quiet which followed the racket of the brawlers. She werlt
into the kitchen to see what might be going dn, and came
upon Farish in an unnatural act with Thelma. The abstract
quotes her testimony in description of the debasing scene
and recital of the ensuing events.

(Abs. 18-20.)

It pictures a whirlwhid of passion, aroused by tlie sudden confrontation of the horrid defilement of her daughter, and the slaying in the heat engendered by the sight of
the deceased's perverted deed.
Our position at the trial was, and is now, that the taking
of life under these circumstarices is justifiable homicide
fdt whieh the mother must be ful1y acquitted and discHarged
und~t the high law of tiattir~ and the statutes of this State.
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.ARGU1\IENT
POI~T

I
.-\ssignment of Errors Nos. IV'.,.. , Vl. \'11, VIII, IX, X,
XI, and XII t.-\bs. 25-~8).

This appeal presents ~, point of first impression in this
jurisdiction. or else\Yhere, so far as '"e have been able to
find from the books, namely :
Is a1z act of Sf.rual pe-rt•ersion by the male a defilement
pf the fem.ale?
It inYolYes the construction of Subsection 4 of Section
8032. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. This provision reads:
8032. Homicide is also justifiabl~ when committed by ~Y person in eith.er of the following
cases:

4. "nen committed in a sudden heat of passion caused by the atte111pt of the deceased to commit a rape upoJl or to defile th~ ~f~, daughter, sister, mother, or other female relative or dependent
of t~e accused, or when the defilement has actually
been committ~.

This t;tah statute defining justifiable homicipe contaips :grovi~ions t~t are wholly ~que, a~d t}lis is perhaps
the first case to be appealed in which these unusual provisions have had a direct application since their adoption
into the body of our Code.
This provision is more than the '~u~w:ritten law" enacted into statute, and it is not a d~clarf!tiQp of the common
law, which merely reduced the slaying from, :Ql.Q.rder to manslaughter, and it seems to go far beyond the limits of the
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statutes of any other State. Somewhat similar statutes are
in effect in New Mexico and Texas.
The New Mexico statute reads:
Code 1915, Section 1468. Any person who kills
another, who is in the act of having carnal knowledge of such person's legal wife, shall be deemed
justifiable; provided, that said husband and wife
are not living separate but together as man and
wife.
This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
of that State in two cases:
State vs. Carabajal, 193 Pac. 406, 17 A. L. R.
1098.
State vs. Greenlee, 269 Pac. 331.
The Texas statute reads:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by the
husband upon the person of any one taken in the
act of adultery with his wife; provided, the killing
takes place before the parties to the act of adultery
have separated. Penal Code, Article 567.
Cited in:
Price vs. State, 18 Texas Appeals 474, 51 Am.
Rep. 322.
And:
46
67
74
94
165
160
180
243

s.
s.
s.
s.
s.
s.

w.
w.

w.
w.
w.
w.
s. w.
s. w.

369.
411.
307.
1041.
583.
465.
254.
1093.
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See also:
Biggs vs. State, 29 Georgia 723, 76 Am. Dec.
638.
The Contmon Law is stated by Blackstone:
··so if a man takes another in the act of adultery
"ith his 'vife. and kills hin1 directly upon the spot,
though this ""as allowed by the laws of Solon, as
likewise by the Ron1an ciYillaw (if the adulterer was
found in the husband's own house), and also among
the ancient Goths. yet in England, it is not absolutely ranked in the class of justifiable homicide as
in the case of a forcible rape, but it is manslaughter.
It is, however~ the lo\\-est degree of it; and therefor
in such a case the court directed the burning in the
hand to be gently inflicted, because there could not
be a greater provocation. 4 Bl. Com. (Chitty) side
page 191."
And Bishop states the common law rule thus:
''If a husband finds his wife committing adultery, and provoked by the wrong instantly takes her
life or the adulterer's * * * the homicide is only
manslaughter. But if on merely hearing of the
outrage he pursues and kills the offender, he commits murder. The distinction rests on the greater
tendency of seeing the passing fact, than of hearing
of it when accomplished, to stir the passions; and
if a husband is not actually witnessing the wife's
adultery, but knows it is transpiring, and in an overpowering passion, no time for cooling having elapsed,
he kills the wrong-doer, the offense is reduced to
manslaughter." 2 Bish. Crim. L. (7th ed.) Sec. 708.
It would seem that at common law the rule reducing
the offense from murder to manslaughter was limited to
the case of a cuckold. The statutes of Texas and New
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Mexico, it will be observed, likewise apply only to the situation of a husband who is confronted with the adultery of
his spouse.
In some cases, however, the principle has been applied
where a father

o~

brotper kills one wpom he detects in adul-

tery or :sexual intercourse with his daughter or sister or
where one kills a man

d~tected

in sexual intercourse with

his betrothed, and in like cases.
29 C.

J.

1143, notes 66, 67, 68, and 69.

One of the citations in the annotation is referred to as
~'~n

unnatural offense wjth defendant's spn."
Reg. vs. Fisher, 8 C. & P.

18~,

34 E. C. L. 679.

We do not have access to this report. It is the only citation
we have been able to find in which the circumstance: of an
-qnp.3tq.ral

~ct

is considered in connection with the principle

involved.
The Utah statute has
cases pn

twi~e b~en

pefore this court in

~PP.~al.

PeppJe

vs~ ~~lliQ.ay,

5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 118.

State vs. Botha, 27 Utah 289, 75 Pac.
731.
.
'

In

~ach

.

-

of these cases, the slayer was

sought to justj(y upder
The reason for the

th~

th~

husbftnd, and

Utah law.

st~t~te

is well

~t~t~d

ip. State vs.

Greenlee, supra.
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··The purpose of the la\v is not vindil'tive. It
is humane. It ret•()g-nizt.'~ t h~ ungo\'t'rnnbll' pa~~ion
"~hicb p(..1$St'sses a n1an \Vht.'n inllllt'tUat t.'ly t·onfron tt.'d
\vith his "·ife's di$honor. It mert'ly ~ay~ the man
·who tnkes life under tho~e circun1~tances is not to
be punished: not bel~ause he has pt'rformed a meritorious deed; but because he has aL"tecl naturally
and humanly. '"' e in N e,,. :\Iexieo have enacted, as
has been enacted in Texas. that. instead of mitigating the homicide to manslaughter. as at common
law. such circumstances justify the act. Such is the
holding of the Texas. lJtah. and Georgia decisions
cited. and such is appellant's contention here."
.A. reading of the l"tah statute at once discloses that

it is not liiPited to th~ case of husband sl~ying wife or
paramour as are the enactments in Texas and New Mexico.
Br its terms the statute applies where the defilement is of
the wife, daughter~ sister. mother or other female relative or
dependent of the acc'ijsed: and the j'ijstificatioiJ runs in favor
of any person who stands in the relationship of husband of
the defiled mfe, father or mother of the defiled daughter,
brother or sister of the defiled sister, son or daughter of a
d~ed mother, and in fact any relative pf a female who is
defiled. The statute goes even to the extent of justifying
homicide where there is no relationship by blood or marriage, but merely the fact of dependency. No distinction
i~ made between father and mother ; parenthood alone invok~ the rule. A mother may take the life of tpe defiler
of~ qaughter jn t:P~ same circ-qmstances as wHI s}lield the
f~tll.~:r, ap.d with U~e i:nupunity.
A q9estjon that i~ not 14i4 by tb~ terms of the statute
jt~~lf js the meaning pf the word "qefile." I!ere j q.qichd
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construction and interpretation is necessary in its application. This court in the Botha case considered and approved
an instruction defining defilement as it related to the facts
of that case. There was no question of an unnatural act.
The claim of justification was simple adultery with the
accused's wife.
The trial court in our case adopted the instruction considered in the Botha case and gave it as the definition of
defilement. It is instruction No. 12, reading as follows:
(Abs. 6.)
"The defilement of a female, as meant by these
instructions, is accomplished when any male person, not the husband of such female, has had sexual
intercourse with such female, and the attempt to
defile a person has been accomplished when such
male person has attempted to have sexual intercourse with such female. The fact of the defilement
or attempted defilement may exist where the female
has given her consent to such sexual intercourse,
as well as when she has not given her consent."
This instruction as well as instructions No. 13, No. 14,
and No. 15 (Abs. 6-8), limit defilement to sexual intercourse.
Instruction No. 12, as given, is good as far as it goes.
The defendant requested this instruction as well as an
amplification of the definition of defilement contained therein to cover all of the facts in the case and particularly defendant's defense. Defendant's requested instruction No. 23
is divided into six paragraphs. The court endorsed it as
follows: "Given in part, refused in part, subject covered
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by instruction given:· The latter part of the endorsement
is hardly a correct staten1ent. The whole subject of our
request was not covered in the instructions as given. No
where in the charge to the jury is there any statement that
our statute applies to a situation of sexual perversion such
as was disclosed as the cause of this homicide.
The court's attention ''"as specifically directed to this
matter in the third paragraph of requested instruction No.
23 (.-\bs. 4). which reads:
"Likewise. an act of sexual perversion, or an
attempt to commit an act of sexual perversion, such
as cunnilingus, is a defilement. within the meaning
of these instructions."
The instructions as given by the court entirely evade
and avoid this whole issue. It was defendant's principal
justification. Her testimony is not seriously disputed on
the record. The deceased's affront to decency provoked
the transport of passion which resulted in the stabbing. It
was not an act of sexual intercourse ; it was an act of sexual
perversion upon the person of this defendant's daughter.
A situation more calculated to arouse, outrage and inflame
could scarcely be conceived by the normal mind. Coming
upon a daughter in the act of nature may or may not provoke a parent to the desperation of homicide; but it can
hardly be imagined that any father or mother could restrain the compelling impulse to slay on being confronted
with the revolting posture of indecency which was exposed
to the view of this defendant on entering the kitchen.
The trial judge, for some inexplicable reason, did not
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touch the subject in his instructions. Either such an act
is a defilement within the meaning of the statute or it is
not, and it was the plain duty of the court to inform the
jury as to what the law was upon this matter, indeli~ate
though it may pave been. The law must sometimes deal
with life in t:Q.e raw. A mere sqqearp.ishness will not excuse
a failure to face unpleasant facts. The jury was not informed al}d was left wholly unjnstructed qpon. the crux of
defendant's justification and in th~ argum.ent we were
not permitted to state the law to be other or piff~r~p.t from
what the court had said it was in the instructions as given;
and so the defen~ant's defense could not be adequately and
fully presented and she was prevep.ted from having a fair
trial upon the facts of her case ap.d the law appli~able thereto.
Will any court in Christendom say that the unnatural
act is not a qefilement of the victimized female? lf it is
a defilement within the purvi~w of oqr statute, then tl}is
case ou~ht to be reversed al}.d the defend~nt ~iven a trial
to a jury that is informed as to what th~ l~w is upon the
facts of her defense.

fOINT II
Assignment qf Errors VI (Abs. 26).
Another
WftS refused
(Abs. 4) :

p~~t

of o~r reqqested in~trqctiop. ·No. ~3, wbich

an~

;not gi ve:q py the coJJrt

re~ds ~s follo~,s

"If the jury believe from the evidence in this
case that the deceased, Jack Farish, had se~ual in-
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ten.~~..)ur~e

''"ith the daughb.'r l)f the deft'tainnt, or
attempted to haYe ~uch in tercour~t' with ht.'r. or
was about to takt:~ her away fron1 ht'r honH' for that
purpose, or that the df'c·ca1.~t'ti conlmitft'd an act of
scJ.~ual perrcrsio11. or afte1nptnf to commit an act of
sf.rual perz'er~ion. upon the daughtt.'r of the defend·
ant. and if the jury further belieYe fron1 the evidence that the defendant killed the deceased, Jack
Farish, in a sudden heat of passion, and if the jury
further believe from the eYidence that said sudden
heat of pa~s.ion 'vas caused by the said conduct of
the deceased, then the jury should find the defendant 'not guilty.' "

Here again by the italicized portion of the request, the
Court's attention was directed to the proposition that an
act of sexusl perversion, or an attempted act of perversion,
upon the daughter of the defendant, was sufficient to invoke
ihe statute and justify the homicide, if seeing it caused the
heat of passiOii which tesulted in tlie g}ayjng.
The whole charge in this case upon the question of
defendant's defense of justification under the statute is
shot through with the vice so frequently condemned by this
court in former decisions; namely, that the instructions are
mere abstract statements of principles of law, and not specific as to the facts of defendant's defense.
State vs. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071.
POINT III
Assignment of Errors VII (Abs. 27).
The eonciudlbg sentenc~

of requested

insttuctidfi No.
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23 reads (Abs. 4):
And if, from all of the evidence in the case, the
jury have a reasonable doubt as to the facts of justification under this instruction, it is the duty of the
jury to aequit the defendant.
No where in its instructions to the jury did the trial
court give this or a similar statement of the law upon the
subject of justification due to the passion aroused from
catching the daughter and the deceased in the illicit act.
Such an instruction was given by the court as applied to
justification on the ground of self defense, which also appeared from the evidence. This court in several decisions
has approved the proposition that where the evidence of
justification raises a reasonable doubt of guilt, it is the
duty of the jury to acquit the defendant.
State vs. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 4.97.
State vs. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 Pac. 275.
State vs. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 Pac. 145.
It is not the burden of the defendant to prove the circumstances of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. We
sought to have this undisputed proposition applied to the
other circumstance of justification in this case. It is respectfully submitted that the failure of the court to so
instruct the jury was prejudicial error and that the judgment ought to be set aside on this further ground.
POINT IV
Assignment of Errors II and III (Abs. 25-26).
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The defendant requested a binding instrul·tion that
she could not be found guilty of murder in either the fir~t
or second degree, and the refusal of these requested instructions is assigned as error. ...-\ny examination of the testimonv in this case. '"e believe "·ill convince the court that,
even wholly disbelieving and disregarding the defendant's
story and considering only the version given by Pace and
Field, the case is at ffil)St one of voluntary manslaughter.
It was unfair to the defendant to put her to the jeopardy
of a finding of guilty on the murder charge. If the jury
had been instructed that they should consider only the
question of manslaughter or not guilty under the plea of
justification, we have no doubt but that they would have
come to the decision .of ''not guilty."
To permit the verdict by compromise to stand in this
case would be a stark denial of justice.

POIXT v"'"
.A.ssignment of Errors I (Abs. 25).
\\. .e also assign as error a question of evidence. The
cross-examination of ~Irs. Besares took a wide field and
the District Attorney was permitted to engage in the tactic
of unlimited harassment and repetition on repetition. He
finally proceeded to examine the defendant as to the purpose of other people being in the premises. Over objection,
the defendant was compelled to answer the following question:

"Mr. Marsh went there for the express purpose of carrying on the booze business there, didn't he?"
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We submit this question had no place in the case; that
it was not cross-examination; that it was wholly incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, whether Marsh went
there for the purpose of carrying on the booze business or
not. The de£ertdant was not on trial for nuisance a:hd Marsh
was not on trial at all. The question was manifestly caiculated to stir the prejudice of the jury against the defendant for being in tlie place and we submit the ruling
constitutes another prejudicial error.
The argument made covers the grounds relied upon for
the motion for :hew trial, the denying of which is likeWise
assigned as ettor. (Abs. 28.)
Respectfulty submitted,
WOOLLEY & HOLTHER,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
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